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When organizations deploy file systems with access con-
trol mechanisms that prevent users from reliably sharing
files with others, these users will inevitably find alternative
means to share. Alas, these alternatives rarely provide the
same level of confidentiality, integrity, or auditability pro-
vided by the prescribed file systems. Thus, the imposition
of restrictive mechanisms and policies by system designers
and administrators may actually reduce the system’s secu-
rity.
We observe that the failure modes of file systems that en-
force centrally-imposed access control policies are similar to
the failure modes of centrally-planned economies: individu-
als either learn to circumvent these restrictions as matters of
necessity or desert the system entirely, subverting the goals
behind the central policy.
We formalize requirements for laissez-faire sharing, which
parallel the requirements of free market economies, to bet-
ter address the file sharing needs of information workers.
Because individuals are less likely to feel compelled to cir-
cumvent systems that meet these laissez-faire requirements,
such systems have the potential to increase both productiv-
ity and security.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6 [Management of Computing and Information Sys-
tems]: System Management, Security and Protection, Eco-
nomics; H.1.2 [Models and Principles]: User/Machine
Systems—Human Factors
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Keywords
File sharing, access control management
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
NSPW’09, September 8–11, 2009, Oxford, United Kingdom
Copyright 2010 ACM 978-1-60558-845-2/09/09 ...$10.00.
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of research into shared file systems, email
remains an enormously popular way to share files. Prior
research has shown that email is used more frequently than
other sharing mechanisms [5, 29] and that many users choose
email as their primary sharing mechanism [31]. Our anecdo-
tal experiences at Microsoft align with these findings; even
those individuals and groups we work with that primarily
use shared file systems (shared folders or SharePoint) in-
evitably resort to email attachments when access controls
interfere with sharing.
Like many before us, we set out to enumerate the user re-
quirements that lead users to circumvent the file sharing sys-
tems prescribed by their organizations. This eﬀort was part
of a larger eﬀort to retrofit an existing file sharing system to
better meet the needs of individual knowledge workers; our
goal was to make Windows shared folders as easy to use as it
is to attach files to email. As we enumerated the needs of in-
dividual knowledge workers we discovered surprising resem-
blances to the economic freedoms and other requirements
that are essential to empowering individual workers in mar-
ket economies. These economic parallels provide theoretical
grounding not only to explain recent survey and interview
results, but also to show that this circumvention of centrally-
managed access control is inevitable.
Indeed, both centrally-planned command economies and
file sharing systems with centralized access control share
similar failure modes. Centrally-managed policies hinder in-
dividual productivity and give individuals less incentive to
participate in the system. As a result many individuals ei-
ther flee the system or subvert central planners as a matter of
necessity. In centrally-planned economies the consequences
of failures include lost productivity, emigration, and the loss
of goods to underground markets.
When users opt for alternatives to organizations’ prescribed
systems for storing and sharing files, the organization will
no longer be able to audit who has accessed the files, en-
sure these files are stored in a secure manner, back up files,
or otherwise protect their integrity. Thus, overly restric-
tive access control policies may negatively impact not only
productivity, but security as well.
For example, restrictions on where shared data can be
accessed often lead users to a dangerous circumvention of
these policies: storage of data on laptops. Of the 570 data
breaches reported to the Open Security Foundations DAT-
ALOSSdb in 2008, 116 (20%) were attributed to information
stored on laptops that were stolen, resulting in an aggregate
loss of 2.6 million individual records [18].1
USB sticks are another example of a mechanism for shar-
ing and transporting data that is attractive for its flexibil-
ity when compared to overly-restrictive file sharing systems.
Alas, USB memory sticks are easily lost and pose a growing
malware threat [27], yet when Beautement et al. interviewed
17 employees of both HP Labs and Merrill Lynch about their
use of USB memory sticks, all reported using them [2]. The
participants from Merrill Lynch reported using these sticks
for the purpose of transporting information.
A particularly dangerous workaround for access control
restrictions is to share a password or other credential for an
authorized account (e.g., your own) with the intended dele-
gate. In interviews with students and technology workers by
Weirich and Sasse, participants reported sharing passwords
when they deemed it necessary to complete their work [30].
The temptation to circumvent policy that overly restricts
productivity can also be seen in the U.S. nuclear weapons
complex. Tober and Hoﬀman’s book on the Wen Ho Lee
case [28, p. 294] quotes a weapons physicist explaining ways
“to circumvent some laws we thought were too restrictive,
to get some work done.”
Even when secrets of national security are at risk, the
costs of access controls that fail to meet the needs of knowl-
edge workers may outweigh the benefits. The fundamental
assumption of many security practitioners, “that the risk of
inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider shar-
ing” was faulted by the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (a.k.a. The 9-11 Commis-
sion) in its investigation of why the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity failed to discover the 9/11 plot [17]. It concluded that
these “Cold War assumptions are no longer appropriate.”
We are not the first to observe the connection between
central planning in economies and in information sharing
systems. Jimmy Wales, co-founder of Wikipedia, reports
being influenced by Nobel Economics Laureate Friedrich
Hayek’s classic essay The Use of Knowledge in Society [8], in
which Hayek argues that centrally-planned economies were
inherently ineﬃcient because only individuals “on the spot”
(or at the “endpoints”, in the networking parlance used by
Wales) maintained the local knowledge necessary to make
decisions [13, 23]. Hayek’s arguments have made Wales wary
of attempts to change Wikipedia in ways that would “cen-
tralize something that can be left decentralized” [23], includ-
ing access control.
We argue that Hayek’s arguments for moving control to
the endpoints is not only applicable to open systems like
Wikipedia, but can be applied more generally to include
closed systems as well. Given the negative impact on both
security and productivity when file sharing systems impose
access control mechanisms that undermine individual infor-
mation workers, we develop a set of requirements for laissez-
faire access control: access control that will let individuals
do what they need to do get their jobs done.2 These require-
ments are ownership, freedom of delegation, transparency,
dependability, and minimization of friction.
1Numerous examples of USB drives containing information
are also detailed, but are less easy to quantify as they are
not explicitly separated from media stolen from secured lo-
cations.
2Laissez-faire is French for “let do”.
We formalize each of the requirements that define laissez-
faire sharing in Section 2, presenting each requirement with
its economic analog. As we present each requirement we
describe how email-based file sharing fares in meeting it.
In Section 3 we detail an ongoing eﬀort to layer laissez-
faire email-based sharing on top of Windows folder sharing.
We explain how the underlying architecture and deployment
choices of desktop/workstation file systems impose barriers
that interfere with our attempts to overlay a laissez-faire
model. In Section 4 we discuss how users’ circumvention of
file sharing technologies that fail to meet these laissez-faire
requirements drives an evolutionary process away from cen-
tralized access control. We discuss further related work in
Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2. DEFINING LAISSEZ-FAIRE SHARING
Laissez-faire sharing is defined by five properties – own-
ership, freedom of delegation, transparency, dependability,
and minimization of friction – which we will now define in
detail. After introducing the definition of each property we
will discuss its analog in economics and work an example,
examining how email-based file sharing fares in achieving
the desired property.
Ownership
The owner of a document, initially the individual
who creates it or first introduces it into a sharing
system, must not be required to sacrifice rights in
order to add the file into the system.
In a market economy, private property rights provide an
incentive for production: the introduction of goods into the
economic system through labor. When individuals do not
enjoy the fruits of their labor underground markets inevitably
emerge to compete with those that are oﬃcially sanctioned.
In file systems, similar competition exists among prescribed
file sharing mechanisms and unsanctioned mechanisms. In-
formation workers may have the opportunity to store their
work on a file system local to their device, a portable storage
device, the shared file system provided by their organization,
or even systems external to the organization for which they
are working. These individuals are less likely to choose to
introduce a document into a prescribed file sharing system
if doing so necessitates forfeiting rights, such as the right
to easily access the file from the location or device of their
choosing. For example, if the owner of a file cannot access
a file share from home, or if remote access is especially bur-
densome, he or she may instead store the file on a USB drive,
send it by email, or place it on a cloud storage website.
Strong ownership may have something to do with the pop-
ularity of email attachments, as email provides as much
ownership as is possible within a file sharing system. By
attaching a file to an email one may sacrifice the ability to
permanently delete the data, prevent readers from forward-
ing it to others, or prevent others from editing their own
copy. However, these sacrifices are all but unavoidable for
any mechanism of sharing information; the perpetual fail-
ures of technologies designed to prevent sharing of software,
music, and movies (digital rights management technologies)
illustrate just how hard it is to prevent those granted access
to read a file from duplicating, modifying, or redistributing
copies if they are intent on doing so.
Freedom of delegation
The owners of a document may grant (delegate)
or deny any or all rights – including the right
to further delegation or even full ownership – to
whomever they so choose, regardless of organiza-
tional or administrative boundaries.
In a market economy, the freedom to contract guarantees
a good’s owner the right to share or sell the good to anyone
she chooses under any mutually agreeable terms. Free trade
seeks to extend these rights beyond local, state, or national
boundaries. When rules or laws interfere with the freedom
to contract, artificially limiting the value that the owner
of a good can legitimately obtain for it, he or she will be
tempted to subvert these rules and exchange the good via
an underground economy.
Similarly, an owner of a document who is prevented from
sharing it with collaborators by the security policies of the
prescribed sharing system (e.g. a Windows share) may sub-
vert these rules by using an alternate sharing mechanism
(e.g. email attachments). The freedom of delegation re-
quirement goes beyond discretionary access control (as de-
fined by Landwehr [11] or Ferraiolo [6]) in that the right to
delegate must be guaranteed for all owned files and not con-
strained by organizational boundaries. Furthermore, when
expressing a delegation policy in terms of groups that may
be owned or controlled by others, it must be possible to
define the terms of the policy as pertaining to the current
membership of a group. If one cannot, the group-owner may
retain greater control over policy than is desired by the file’s
owner.
While the freedom to restrict access or further delegation
may initially seem counter to a laissez-faire philosophy, such
restrictions are the foundation of intellectual property law
designed to spur innovation.
Freedom of delegation is one of the most attractive proper-
ties of email attachments, as files can be shared with anyone
(or any group) with an email address.
Transparency
The owners of (and ideally all contributors to)
a document must be able to quickly and easily
find and comprehend the rights associated with
it, including such meta-rights as delegation. All
changes to the document or its rights must be at-
tributable to the individual who made the change.
In a market economy, transparency of ownership rights
is essential in enabling investors to contract those rights.
Transfers of rights in market economies are made explicit
via deeds and licenses issued by states and contracts made
among individuals or organizations. Without the rule of law
to enforce these contracts and provide accountability, par-
ticipants in market economies may be afraid to form agree-
ments that would otherwise be profitable.
Rights transparency ensures that individual contributors
know who will and will not have rights to access their con-
tributions. Individuals are less likely to contribute informa-
tion into the system if they are afraid that those whom they
would not want to access a document will be able to do so,
or that those who should have access will be unable to ob-
tain it. The need for rights transparency was observed as
early as 1974, when Jerome Saltzer called for “better under-
standing the nature of the typical user’s mental description
of protection intent” to devise “interfaces which permit more
direct specification of that protection intent” [24].
One barrier inhibiting users from sharing editing rights
(write permissions) on documents is the risk to the integrity
of their documents: undesirable changes may go undetected,
it may not be possible to identify the individual who made
the change, and the value of the document before the change
may not be recoverable. Systems that provide transactional
transparency – allowing contributors to identify, attribute,
and roll back changes – reduce these risks, increase the like-
lihood of sharing, and thus increase the potential value at-
tainable through the use of a file sharing system.
Email sharing is extremely transparent. The recipients
box in the composition window of most email clients pro-
vides a clear, comprehensible interface for specifying the set
of individuals (delegates) who will receive (be permitted to
read) an attached document. The sender of a message is
identified as the source of the most recent changes to the
document and the list of other recipients appear next to
the to and cc headers. Changes are made explicit through
the creation of a new email. Forwarding and use of the bcc
field enable delegates to further delegate the ability to read
a file to others, and do so without attribution. However,
such losses of transparency are unavoidable in any sharing
system. If those authorized to read a file want to subvert
access controls designed to keep others from reading a file
or track who has read it, they will always be able to pho-
tograph, record, or even manually copy the information to
an unprotected medium. Thus, it can be argued that email
provides the greatest level of transparency that is possible
to achieve.
Dependability
Users must be able to rely on the sharing system
to both store and transmit their information both
reliably and securely, enforcing their chosen shar-
ing (access control) policies.
Investors are more likely to invest in a stable economic sys-
tem than an unstable one when all other factors are equal.
Witness, for example, the capital available to the U.S. trea-
sury at low cost as a result of its high perceived stability.
Policy stability is also important to investors wary of the
risks of investing in economies in which firms may be na-
tionalized at the whim of government oﬃcials. Users of a
file system require similar assurances that their data will be
safe and that their policies will be enforced correctly.
While many users find email dependable enough to rely
on for many of their communications needs, email systems
are not without failures. Email may be incorrectly marked
as spam, dropped due to attachment size, intercepted, or
forged. However, these failures are relatively rare and since
email is already in wide use its users have developed user-
layer protocols to detect and recover from many failures
when an email is of suﬃcient importance. For example, it
is not unusual for important emails to be accompanied by
phone calls or requests for confirmation of receipt. While
unencrypted email is subject to interception at the network
level (man-in-the-middle attacks), such attacks are exceed-
ingly rare and so the great majority of users still consider
email suﬃciently secure and thus dependable. One advan-
tage of email-based sharing is that the dependability of the
file transfer is linked to the dependability of the email used
to notify the recipient of its existence; if the email arrives,
so too will the attachment.
Minimal friction
A sharing system should be free of barriers that
unnecessarily or excessively inhibit sharing.
In market economies, the term friction refers to barriers
that inhibit transactions that would otherwise increase the
common good. Such barriers include tax policies and infor-
mation asymmetries, though in some ways friction serves as
a catch-all for barriers to the eﬃcient use of the system not
explicitly detailed in the previous set of requirements.
The management of access control policies and the impo-
sition posed by incorrectly formed policies introduce signifi-
cant friction into file sharing systems. For example, the de-
signers of the Multics access control mechanisms recognized
that it was too complex; accordingly, it was simplified [10] as
the system evolved. In one example, per-ring ACLs were re-
moved, since no one used them. In another, a feature known
as “common access control lists” – per-directory permission
specifications that applied to all files within it, in addition
to specific ACLs for individual files [19] – was deleted by
1972 because it led to “frequent mistakes and confusion, in
violation of the design principle that calls for naturalness
and ease of use” [24].
Email-based sharing, on the other hand, piggybacks on
users’ existing process of notifying collaborators that new
content is available. Email clients already help users manage
individual contacts and groups (mailing lists). The contact
management tools that help users specify the recipients of an
email (those with access to read it) are leveraged to control
access to the attachment as well.
On the other hand, using email attachments for collabo-
ratively editing documents introduces friction, as user-level
protocols are required to lock documents for editing, resolve
conflicts, and send updates—problems that traditional file
sharing systems seek to address.
What laissez-faire sharing is not
We have encountered a number of misconceived assumptions
about laissez-faire sharing among those exposed to early ver-
sions of this work and our presentation to the New Security
Paradigms Workshop. We thus feel compelled to put some
of these to rest.
The adoption of laissez-faire sharing systems does not nec-
essarily imply the adoption of looser or more open policies
that grant more users access to files. Rather, it only implies
that the owner will make the decision of who has access to
the file. In fact, file owners may become more comfortable
using defaults that grant few others access if the friction to
grant access to additional users is suﬃciently reduced. This
was part of the motivation for the Slackcess Control system
discussed in 3.
The adoption of laissez-faire sharing does not require one
to assume that their users are more trustworthy than those
of systems with centrally-administered access-control poli-
cies do. If some users aren’t trustworthy, no mechanism will
be able to protect the resources that they have been given
access to from being compromised.
The adoption of laissez-faire sharing does not prevent cen-
tral administrators from providing policy guidance. System
administrators may still set the default policy for new users
to the system, and defaults hold great power. Furthermore,
system administrators may still provide low-friction warn-
ings to indicate if a policy is about to be violated and the
consequences of doing so. These are of value as users are
more likely to violate a security policy if they are not aware
of it and convinced of its importance. A laissez-faire shar-
ing system will allow owners to override the central policy
guidance if he or she is not convinced it applies to his or
her situation, but this may not make the system less secure:
motivated users will be able to override any attempts to re-
strict information from being copied regardless of technical
obstacles. While the consequences imposed for departing
from a prescribed policy are external to the system, it is im-
portant to note that administrators will only be alerted to
such departures if users can override the policies within the
system, rather than by circumventing it entirely.
Finally, laissez-faire sharing systems are not dismissive of
the rights of readers or editors with whom files are shared
but who do not, themselves, have ownership rights. While
owners can restrict others from delegating read access, they
are as powerless as central system administrators in pre-
venting re-sharing. For example, a reader could be asked
(but not forced) to request permission before granting oth-
ers read access. Those who can only read a file, but wish
to edit it, will inevitably be able to copy the file’s contents
into a new version that they own, even if they must do so
manually. The owner of the original version will not see the
updates, but the owners of new branches can edit and share
them with whomever they wish. Again, the consequences
of unauthorized re-sharing and branching are outside the
bounds of the system and depend on the social contract be-
tween the file owners and those they share with. Like system
administrators, owners who allow their preferred policies to
be overridden are more likely to know when overrides occur.
Thus, owners who choose to may apply laissez-faire princi-
ples by issuing recommendations, rather than restrictions,




Traditional file sharing mechanisms do have advantages
over email-based sharing. Windows shared folders (the built-
in file sharing system in Windows) provide users access to
the most recently saved copy of a file without requiring
manual updates be sent by the most recent contributor.
Windows shared folders also provide synchronization mech-
anisms to prevent simultaneous editing that could result in
conflicting versions. Furthermore, Windows shared folders
are space-eﬃcient in that only a single copy of a document
need be stored for all those with access to it, whereas each
email server must store its own copy of an attached docu-
ment (and many store one copy per recipient). Alas, per-
missioning of Windows shared folders introduces significant
friction; users are forced to interrupt their application task
flow to interact with OS-provided access control interfaces.
These interfaces have been shown to be tedious and diﬃ-
cult to understand [22]. We sought to minimize the friction
that access-control mechanisms impose on Windows shared
folders by making them work more like email-based shar-
ing. This goal of reducing the eﬀort required to successfully
permission and share files inspired us to name the project
Slackcess Control.
Figure 1: Slackcess Control adds a pane to the mes-
sage composition window to warn the user a recipi-
ent does not have access.
3.1 Design and goals
We developed Slackcess Control as an extension to Mi-
crosoft’s Outlook email client. When a user composes a mes-
sage containing a link to a file stored in a Windows shared
folder, this extension queries the access control interfaces in
Windows to determine whether any of the message’s recipi-
ents lack the ability to read (or edit) the document. When
one or more recipients lack the permissions required to ac-
cess the linked file, Slackcess Control alerts the user – via
a ribbon at the top of the message composition window –
and oﬀers to update the access control settings to grant the
missing permissions. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a
message composition window containing such a warning.
We hoped that Slackcess Control would reduce the occur-
rence of a common annoyance in our work lives: receiving
email with links to files that we could not access. We also
hoped that making it easier to grant permissions at the file
level would result in a net increase in security, as users could
now set safe (e.g. owner-only) default permissions and trust
that additional permissions would be eﬀortlessly granted as
needed. Finally, we hoped that the highly developed group
management (mailing list) capabilities in email clients would
make it easy for users to reason about the groups they were
sharing with.
3.2 Windows sharing–ce n’est pas laissez-faire
Our attempt to layer Slackcess Control on top of Win-
dows shared folders led to numerous problems that, in ret-
rospect, could have been anticipated by examining support
for laissez-faire sharing in Windows. Windows shared fold-
ers use access control lists to specify who may read, write,
delete, and modify the permissions to folders (directories) in
a hierarchy.
Users who are given directories in which to store files (e.g.
a home directory) may not be given to change these files’ per-
missions or read them from a remote location. Thus, both
ownership and freedom of delegation in Windows shared
folders are provided only at the discretion of the system
administrators who set default permissions. Our experience
tells us the system administrators who have this power have
diﬃculty resisting the temptation to use it; they may do
so out of fear that they will be held responsible if security
failures result from access control policies deemed, after the
fact, to be too lax. When run by a user without suﬃcient
permissions to a linked file, Slackcess Control may be unable
to evaluate whether a recipient of this link will be able to
read it.
Even if the user has access to change the permissions for
a document at the file system level (the NTFS-level per-
missions) and Slackcess Control grants the required permis-
sions, a second set of permissions specific to the shared folder
implementation (share-level permissions) may override these
grants. Remote access to files on Windows shared folders is
allowed only when access has been granted via both the file
system (NTFS) permissioning infrastructure and on a per-
share basis via the shared folder infrastructure. Again, indi-
vidual users may not have access to read, let alone change,
permissions on shares. Thus, freedom of delegation may be
limited at both the NTFS and share levels.
Windows shared folders also lack rights transparency as
share permissions are not visible to all users. Thus, Slack-
cess Control may not be able to determine who does, and
does not, have access to a user’s file. Slackcess Control may
attempt to grant NTFS permissions to a recipient but – un-
able to read let alone change the share permissions – cannot
guarantee that the recipient will be able to access the file
as a result. Thus, in many cases Slackcess Control cannot
achieve suﬃcient rights transparency or perceived depend-
ability. This is not a shortcoming of the Slackcess Control
implementation but of the underlying file system. Users who
employ the interfaces built into Windows to modify NTFS
permissions and verify – using the eﬀective permissions in-
terface – that a recipient can read the file may still find that
the recipient is denied access at the share-level when he or
she tries to access it. This shortcoming is a consequence of
a failure to grant file owners the ability to view the share
permissions, and to incorporate share level permissions as
part of the calculation of eﬀective permissions.
Even when system administrators grant ownership and
provide for free delegation, Windows shared folders have not
traditionally supported delegation to users who are outside
the organization: domain or local accounts must be created
to support external users. Even as such support is added,
support for external users is often hindered by firewalls that
would prevent access from outside an organization. Thus,
if Slackcess Control wants to help users share documents on
Windows file shares with recipients outside of their orga-
nization, the best it can do is attach the document to the
email on the user’s behalf.
Finally, transactional transparency is notably lacking in
Windows shared folders and there is little Slackcess Control
can do to address this. While changes to Windows file shares
may be logged, the owners of individual documents and con-
tributors rarely have access to these logs. Once one writer
overwrites a file, previous versions are no longer available.
4. EVOLUTIONARY PRESSUREDRIVING
LAISSEZ-FAIRE SHARING
Economies compete for talent, investment, business, and
trade. Their ability to compete drives a process of natural
selection through which laissez-faire economies have increas-
ingly driven out centrally planned ones.
Just as free market economies place evolutionary pres-
sure on centrally-managed ones, the ongoing selection of file
sharing mechanisms by individuals places similar pressure
on these mechanisms. Whenever access control policies fail
to provide the flexibility users need to do their work, users
will be tempted to switch to systems with a more laissez-
faire approach to access control.
As with centrally-planned economies, some may argue
that their limitations reflect the fact that they have yet to be
properly implemented and so their potential has not yet been
realized. There is no shortage of research on more expressive
access control models and languages that one might deploy
in hopes of reducing the frequency with which centralized
access control impedes productivity. We believe that the
best one can do by increasing the expressiveness of central-
ized policies is to reduce the rate at which users abandon
centralized access control regimes.
As new sharing mechanisms better meet workers’ demand
for laissez-faire policies, system administrators must choose
between adapting their policies to meet user needs or risk
having their users circumvent the systems they support and
prescribe. The less attractive an organization’s sharing mech-
anism is in comparison to the alternatives, the more likely
it is that users will choose the alternatives to store their
files and that the organization will lose the ability to ensure
that files are stored securely, backed up, and that accesses
may be audited. As an increasing number of systems sup-
port laissez-faire sharing and information workers become
increasingly familiar with their benefits, the evolutionary
pressure increases against overly restrictive sharing systems.
We see this ongoing evolution in play today not just in
the popularity of email and USB sticks, but in the increased
adoption of wikis in corporate environments [12]. Indeed,
even the U.S. national intelligence community has created
their own wiki, known as “Intellipedia” [3]. One interest-
ing development in this evolutionary process is the success
of Microsoft’s SharePoint, for which a single “site collection”
administrator can support a single server with independently
administered “sites” [14]. Thus, SharePoint pushes adminis-
tration of access control policies closer to the endpoints by
distributing management of sites to the center of the teams
for which they are purposed. While each team may still have
a central administrator, it is at least more likely that it is
someone an individual user will know.
Systems like SharePoint, in turn, must now compete with
cloud storage products like Google Docs and Microsoft Of-
ficeLive. Docs and OﬃceLive provide suﬃcient ownership
and allow users to access their files from anywhere they can
reach the web. Earlier research has already cited cases in
which individuals use cloud storage to transfer files in order
to access them outside of work [5]. Cloud storage products
also allow users to delegate to anyone with an email address
and maintain the ability to revoke access. Cloud storage
products take transparency to new levels by allowing users
to see others’ changes in real time. Dependability is on par
with that of web-based email, for which the rarity of secu-
rity failures and outages is evidenced by the attention that
these events receive when they do occur. To the chagrin of
many a corporate IT department, employees who use these
cloud storage systems are also delegating the management
and security of their data to the operators of these services.
As cloud storage increases in popularity, an increasingly
pressing decision will face system administrators and IT de-
partments: whether to deploy an internal system that meets
all the laissez-faire requirements supported by cloud storage,
to entrust data to an externally managed system that meets
these requirements, or to implement strict (but inevitably
ineﬀective) policies requiring the use of prescribed sharing
mechanisms so as to protect themselves from blame. The
choice to adopt laissez-faire systems is the one that maxi-
mizes the amount of data that stays within the control of
the organization, where it can be stored securely, backed up,
and audited.
5. RELATEDWORK
Friedrich Hayek observed in The Use of Knowledge in So-
ciety that problems in centrally managed polices arise as the
consequence of change, that such changes are first observed
by the individuals “on the spot”, and that these individuals
at the endpoints are best equipped to manage changes [8].
We are not the first to draw parallels between these economic
philosophies and access control. As we discuss in the intro-
duction, Jimmy Wales cites Hayek’s influence leading him
to eschew centralized control in Wikipedia [23]. Miller et
al. also cite Hayek’s economic theories in the context of
security in software engineering to advocate that security
policies should be specified close to the functions they are
intended to protect [15]. Cheng et al. cite Hayek in their
proposal for Fuzzy Multi-Level Security [4]
Those frustrated that a flood of new languages, logics, and
algebras for expressing and reasoning about access control
policies has not resulted in systems that are comprehensible
to users may take solace in Hayek’s similar frustrations with
economic theorists: “The character of the fundamental prob-
lem has, I am afraid, been obscured rather than illuminated
by many of the recent refinements in . . . theory, particularly
by many of the uses made of mathematics” [8].
Parallels with Hayek’s economic theories provide the back-
ground for why centrally-controlled policies fail and why
more expressive policies don’t help, the first two subsec-
tions of related work that we explore. We then examine
approaches from usability researchers to the problem of file
sharing, many of which focus on addressing rights trans-
parency and friction. Finally, we explore the emergence of
systems that rely on optimistic access control, which meets
all laissez-faire requirements with the exception of the right
not to share.
5.1 Centrally-controlled policies fail
In a survey of 56 employees of a “medium-sized industrial
research laboratory” by Whalen et al., 55 (98%) reported
that their most frequent means of file sharing was email.
In a survey of ten employees of a medium-sized research
organization3 presented in 2006, Voida et al. found that
3This study was performed at PARC, the same medium-
sized research organization as Whalen et al., and so these
studies results may not be as independent as they would
otherwise appear.
email-based sharing was used in 43% of the sharing instances
reported, vs. 16% for shared folders [29], and that respon-
dents who did use traditional file sharing systems reported
falling back to email when they were unable to grant per-
mission using those systems. They found that knowledge
workers chose file-sharing mechanisms to meet the needs of
a situation and identified ten features that aﬀected decision
making. Amongst the ten features were universal scope (i.e.,
the ability to share with anyone), which is similar to our
property of freedom of delegation; visibility, logging, and
versioning, which are all part of our property of transac-
tional transparency; and specification of access control and
access rights, which we include under the properties of own-
ership and freedom of delegation. Miltchev et al. demon-
strated a method of allowing sharing across organizational
boundaries thus partially fulfilling the freedom of delegation
property [16].
Dalal et al., also at PARC, conducted a field study of ten
individuals from various domains to identify ad-hoc sharing
practices among knowledge workers [5]. They found cor-
porate security policies were unable to support the sharing
needs of users. The inflexibility forced users to employ a
number of insecure and undesirable methods in order to get
their job done. They found “that people regularly bypass
secure access procedures by using public web repositories,
personal email, and USB drives to transfer information (in-
securely).”Their results show all participants used email for
sharing in some tasks, even emailing snippets of code to
a personal account to allow them to work at home. They
found these issues arose most often when sharing between
groups within a company, granting short term access, shar-
ing between one user’s own devices, and outside consultants.
The users in this study expressed requirements for what we
have called ownership, freedom of delegation across domains,
rights transparency, and dependability.
5.2 More expressive policies don’t help
Attempts to address the limitations of centrally-managed
access control go back as far as Shen and Dewan’s attempt
to provide a more fine-grained access-control model for col-
laboration in multi-user environments [25]. Role-based ac-
cess control (RBAC) [26] is perhaps the most well known
approach to solving problems of access control by chang-
ing how policies are expressed. By introducing roles as a
level of indirection between people and the rights they have
to resources, RBAC was intended to help administrators
align access-control policies more closely with organizational
structures and objectives.
Alas, in both economies and file systems, central planners
fail to account for losses to individual productivity that re-
sult when policies are overly restrictive and the security risks
that result when individuals try to work around these poli-
cies. A NIST-funded 100-plus paged report on the economic
benefits of RBAC (see [7]) illustrates such disregard. The
researchers quantified the time required to provision (add)
employees, de-provision (remove) them, and make changes
to policy for existing employees—costs borne by administra-
tors. With the exception of time lost during provisioning,
no consideration was made for user-borne costs such as the
number of legitimate actions prevented by overly restrictive
policies, productivity loss while employees await access, or
the number of instances in which users worked around poli-
cies by circumventing prescribed systems or practices.
5.3 Approaches from usability researchers
Most sharing systems developed by usability researchers
focus on increasing transparency and reducing friction.
Kapadia et al.’s KNOW system adds transparency; it sits
within an access control system and provides feedback when
access is denied to help explain why access is denied and
how it might be obtained [9]. The Expandable Grid, de-
veloped by Reeder et al. to manage NTFS access control
policies, adds transparency by enabling users to manage ef-
fective permissions rather than abstract policies [21]. Like
Slackcess Control, Balfanz’s ESCAPE file-sharing tool at-
tempts to reduce friction by integrating message composi-
tion and sharing. Whereas Slackcess Control employs users’
existing message composition experience for file sharing, ES-
CAPE moves the message composition experience into the
file sharing system [1].
Zurko et al. were amongst the first to build an access-
control management system with usability in mind—but fo-
cused only on the usability needs of a central policy ad-
ministrator. Their Visual Policy Builder interface to their
Adage system made policies more transparent and reduced
the friction to create them [34].
Zurko [35] and Yee [32, 33] provide design guidance with
which Slackcess Control and laissez-faire file sharing are aligned.
Zurko proposed achieving usable security by adding security
into a process that is already usable; with Slackcess Control,
we sought to make file sharing with email more secure. Yee
argues for “security by designation”, in which users grant ac-
cess to resources implicitly in the course of their work when
they request that a system carry out an action [33]. Slackcess
Control implements security by designation for files shared
via email. Our laissez-faire requirements (and the Slackcess
Control system) encompass many of the general properties
suggested by Yee in User Interaction Design for Secure Sys-
tems [32]: least resistance (our minimization of friction); ex-
plicit authorization and revocability (freedom of delegation);
expected ability, expressiveness, and clarity (transparency).
5.4 Optimistic access control policies
At the 1999 New Security Paradigms Workshop, Dean
Povey proposed an “optimistic” approach to access control
in which users may override access control restrictions and
violations are handled post-facto through rollback and at-
tribution [20]. Thus, Povey favors transparency for achiev-
ing reduced friction at the cost of freedom of delegation–
removing the right not to share.
Wikipedia provides an excellent example of optimistic ac-
cess control, using change histories and self policing in place
of access control restrictions. Heavier-weight access control
mechanisms are reserved for those entries that prove contro-
versial enough to require them.
Laissez-faire systems employ optimistic policies for actions
that cannot be prevented: such as sharing a file the user al-
ready has access to with someone else. However, in laissez-
faire systems access cannot be acquired optimistically with-
out the help of someone who already has access.
Optimistic security may at first appear to pose an evolu-
tionary threat to laissez-faire sharing—it does not. When
information owners must choose where to store their infor-
mation, the freedom of delegation required by laissez-faire
systems guarantees that they will be able to delegate opti-
mistically if they so choose.
6. CONCLUSION
Individual information workers circumvent prescribed file
sharing systems when these systems’ access controls im-
pede their productivity or otherwise fail to meet their needs.
We have introduced five requirements of laissez-faire shar-
ing necessary (though not in all cases suﬃcient) to meet
the needs of information workers. These requirements are
ownership, freedom of delegation, transparency, dependabil-
ity, and minimization of friction. Each requirement’s analog
from economics helps elucidate the consequent ineﬃciencies
that result when a system fails to satisfy it.
Given individual tendencies to choose laissez-faire sharing
mechanisms, system administrators must choose to either
deploy and support systems that meet laissez-faire require-
ments or – voluntarily or not – relinquish control over the
storage of workers’ data. Only by adopting laissez-faire shar-
ing can administrators hope to limit the number of systems
trusted to store their organizations’ data and to enforce their
users’ chosen access control policies. Thus, we contend, the
evolutionary path to widespread adoption of laissez-faire ac-
cess control is both inevitable and well underway.
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